共享经济平台交易费用规制研究  

Transaction Fee Regulation for Sharing Economy Platforms

作　　者：马清 许恒 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学经济学院,成都611130 [2]西南财经大学工商管理学院,成都611130

出　　处：《产业经济评论》2018年第1期15-23,共9页Review of Industrial Economics

摘　　要：本文运用拉姆齐定价法对拥有较强市场势力的共享经济平台公司交易费用的规制进行深入分析。研究表明,以利润最大化为目标的共享经济平台公司向通过其进行交易的供给方与需求方收取的费用过高,使供需双方的福利受到损害。以社会经济福利最大化为目标的政府应该对共享经济平台的交易费用进行规制。具体而言,在保障共享经济平台公司不亏损的情况下,当其运营成本较低时,政府应该大幅降低共享经济平台的交易费用;当其运营成本较高时,政府应该小幅降低共享经济平台的交易费用。本文还利用数值模拟考察供需双方的共享经济平台参与度及其外部选择成本对政府实行交易费用规制的影响。By applying the Ramsey Pricing, this paper rigorously investigates the transaction fee regulation for a sharing economy platform frm with strong market power. It shows that the transaction fees charged by the sharing economy platform frm whose goal is to maximize proft are too high, which reduces the welfare of Producers and Consumers. The government with the goal of social welfare maximization should regulate the transaction fess of the sharing economy platform. Specifcally, without causing loss to the sharing economy platform frm, the government should dramatically reduce the platform’s transaction fees when its operating cost is low. When such cost is high, the government should slightly reduce the platform’s transaction fees. In addition, this paper uses numerical simulation to examine the impact of the participation of suppliers and demanders and the cost of their outside option on the government’s transaction fee regulation.

关 键 词：共享经济平台 交易费用规制 拉姆齐定价法 市场势力 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]