逻辑学的规范性  

The Normativity of Logic

作　　者：刘靖贤[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学哲学与公共管理学院,辽宁沈阳110136

出　　处：《学术界》2018年第1期47-55,共9页Academics

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"当代逻辑学重大前沿问题研究"(17ZDA024)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：逻辑学既被看作描述性学科也被看作规范性学科。但是,由于哈尔曼的挑战,逻辑规律根本不同于人们在实际思维活动中所遵守的规范。桥梁原则试图建立起逻辑学的规律性与规范性之间的联结。然而,受到逻辑学自身要求的限制,任何桥梁原则都不能完美地回避哈尔曼的反驳。这表明,逻辑学的规范性所容纳的适度灵活性与其规律性本身所具有的呆板性和僵滞性是对立冲突的。从认知角度出发,根据谦虚谨慎与温和怀疑的精神,有必要弱化逻辑学自身的要求,把经典的二值逻辑转变为非经典的多值逻辑或真值度逻辑,在认知的谦和性与宽容性的基础上建立逻辑学的规范性。Logic is regarded as a descriptive and normative discipline. Due to Harman's challenge,logical laws are different from logical norms that are followed in ordinary thinking activities. Bridge Principles attempt to connect logical laws with logical norms. However,because of the requirements of logic as such,any bridge principle cannot avoid Harman's objections. This shows that the flexibility of logical norms conflicts with the strictness and obtuseness of logical laws. From the epistemic perspective,it is necessary to weaken the requirements of logic as such; that is,the classic bivalent logic need to be transformed into non-classical many-valued or truth-degree logic. Then,logical norms can be established on the basis of cognitive modesty and tolerance.

关 键 词：逻辑学 规范性 桥梁原则 

分 类 号：B81-05[哲学宗教—逻辑学]