零售商的斯塔克伯格团购博弈分析  

Stackelberg game analysis of retailers’ group buying

作　　者：王甜源 傅科[1] 刘竞[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广州510275 [2]中山大学南方学院,广州510970

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2018年第2期401-413,共13页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71222105,71671192,71431007)~~

摘　　要：团购成员企业在相互合作的同时也相互竞争．论文同时考虑了团购成员的合作与竞争，针对成员先后决策，序贯博弈的情形，研究了两家零售商面对斯塔克伯格团购博弈时的选择以及相应的库存和定价策略，并解出了两家零售商库存、定价的均衡解．研究结果还表明，当两家零售商的市场潜力差距较小，即两家零售商实力更相近时，双方都偏好团购．此外产品替代程度和批量折扣程度会综合影响两家零售商的定价，订购量以及利润，且往往与双方的市场实力差距有关．Group buying members compete and cooperate with each other. By considering both members＇ cooperation and competition, this research focuses on successive decisions and sequential game and studies two retailers＇ choices and how they make inventory and pricing decisions when facing a Stackelberg game in group buying. The paper also solves both retailers＇ equilibrium solutions of inventory and pricing. The results show that both retailers prefer group buying if they have similar market powers. Furthermore, the degree of product substitution and quantity discount and the difference of retailers＇ market powers jointly influence their pricing, inventory and profit.

关 键 词：团购 批量折扣 竞争 零售 序贯博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]