清末预备立宪民主改革失败的策略互动分析  

One Game Theoretic Explanation of the Failure in Preparation for Constitutionalism in the Late Qing Dynasty

作　　者：刘舒杨 王浦劬[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院国家治理研究院,北京100871

出　　处：《华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2017年第6期22-29,共8页Journal of Central China Normal University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"推进国家治理现代化研究"(014ZDA011);国家"万人计划"项目"当代中国治理模式研究"

摘　　要：预备立宪是中国近代民主化改革的首次尝试,本文以策略互动模型分析预备立宪的过程和失败原因,具有方法论创新和细化分析的新意。事实表明,民主转型的结果,实际取决于政权内部的保守派、改革派与政权外部的温和派与激进派之间的博弈互动。预备立宪作为一项由清廷领导的自上而下的政治改革,其结果取决于满洲贵族、北洋派、立宪派与革命派之间的合作竞争。本文利用普沃斯基的策略互动模型解释了清末四类政治行为主体的形成,通过主体在不同时期的互动关系解释了预备立宪由产生到失败的原因。文章指出,预备立宪的最终破产拉开了民主主义革命的帷幕,而中国共产党人领导的新民主主义革命的最终胜利,无疑是历史的必然。Preparation for constitutionalism in the late Qing Dynasty is the first democratization reform in China,and analyzing its process and causes of failure with the model of strategic interaction is helpful to supplement existing researches.This article involves methodology innovation.The result of the democratization transformation is based on game behavior among the conservatives, the innovationists, the moderates and the radicals. Preparation for constitutionalism is a political reform,whose results are based on the game behavior among the aristocracy,the Northern warlords,the constitutionalist and the revolutionary.This article explains the process and result of preparation for constitutionalism with the model by Przeworski,and finds that the failure in preparation for constitutionalism leads to democratic revolution.The success of new-democratic revolution by the leadership of Chinese Communist Party is the historical inevitability.

关 键 词：预备立宪 策略互动 民主化转型 

分 类 号：D691.2[政治法律—政治学]