反垄断法视野中的欺诈行为  

Dealing with Deception in Light of Anti-monopoly Law

作　　者：刘进[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学法政学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《南京大学学报（哲学．人文科学．社会科学）》2018年第1期51-64,共14页Journal of Nanjing University(Philosophy,Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学一般项目(15YJA820013)

摘　　要：从域外实践来看,欺诈行为正逐渐受到反垄断法的关注,需求增加型市场力量论为反垄断法规制欺诈行为提供了理论基础。具有市场支配地位的企业实施欺诈行为可能产生获得或维持市场垄断力、增加竞争对手成本、客户先占等排除限制竞争的效果,而"消费者反冲"无法消除欺诈行为的竞争损害,因此,依靠市场自身力量无法应对虚假宣传行为的负面影响,反垄断法有其适用空间。在我国,将欺诈行为纳入反垄断法规制范畴有助于厘清反垄断法与反不正当竞争法的关系。在反垄断法规制欺诈行为视角下,我国关于"滥用市场支配地位行为"的立法存在不合理之处。以欺诈等"廉价排挤性行为"作为我国反垄断法执法重点的选择有利于合理配置执法资源,树立反垄断法的法律权威。In recent years,more and more foreign courts and authorities consider deception as an antitrust violation. The theory of Demand-Increasing market power provides the basis for the opposition to the malpractices. With deception,those market dominators may obtain or maintain their market power so as to increase the cost of their competitors,or to preempt customers to restrict competition."Consumer backlash"cannot reduce the competition damages of deceptions,meaning that market alone cannot cure the negative competition effect of deception,so the anti-monopoly law is in need to regulate such market behavior. In China,putting deceptions under the regulation of anti-monopoly law may help to draw a clearer distinction between anti-monopoly law and anti-unfair competition law.From this perspective,we may furthermore find the legislation of "abuse of dominant market position"is somewhat unreasonable. Paying more attention to deception--a means of"cheap exclusion"helps to allocate enforcement resources reasonably,and helps the public with their faith in anti-monopoly law.

关 键 词：“雾件”行为 滥用市场支配地位 需求增加型市场力量 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]