对“一把手”权力集中现象的另一种解释——基于控制权收益的视角  

An Explanation to Centralization of Power in the Hand of Top Chief Executive——From the Perspective of Benefit of Control

作　　者：田妮[1] 张宗益[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第9期70-78,共9页Systems Engineering

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(CDJSK 100080;CQDXWL-2012-185)

摘　　要：我国企业尤其是国有企业的"一把手"权力集中现象十分突出,本文从控制权收益视角分析认为是大股东与管理层合作获取并分享控制权收益的需要促使企业做出这样的控制权配置决策。本文通过建立大股东和管理层之间的合作博弈模型,利用夏普利值测算了均衡时大股东和管理层的控制权收益的理论值,结果发现,为了获取更多的控制权收益,大股东的最优决策就是选择投资水平最高的唯一一位管理层成员参与其控制权收益获取活动,并分享其控制权收益,这就是造成"一把手"权力高度集中现象的重要原因。本文的分析不仅给了"一把手"权力集中现象一个新的理论解释,同时也加深了对控制权收益的认识。In China, the reality that most authority of a firm centralized in the hand of ＂the first hand＂ who is the top chief executive of the firm attracted much attention from researchers. This paper proposes a new explanation for this issue from the perspective of benefit of control. It is explained that the large shareholder and management of a firm cooperate to excavate and share the benefit of control. In this cooperation, the optimal decision of large shareholder results in the allocation decision of the control right. A cooperative game model is used to analyze this cooperation mechanism and a solution of cooperative game, Shapley value, is used to calculate the value of the benefit of control of management and large shareholder respectively. The result of this theoretical analysis shows that the optimal decision of large shareholder is just to allocate the right of control to the only one management who can invest the highest level of human capital in excavating activity. This gives a new explanation to highly centralized control rights in practice, which also enriches the understanding of benefit of control.

关 键 词：控制权收益 合作博弈 夏普利值 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]