NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF TWO GAME MODELS ON THE RANDOM SOCIAL NETWORK  

作　　者：Min Xia 

机构地区：[1]Dept.of Statistics,School of Mathematical Sciences,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200240,PR China

出　　处：《Annals of Applied Mathematics》2017年第4期417-427,共11页应用数学年刊（英文版）

基　　金：supported by National Basic Research Program of China(973 Program,2015CB856004);National Natural Science Foundation of China(11531001)

摘　　要：It is known that somebody＇s behavior （decision） in a stochastic social net- work may be influenced by that of his （or her） friends. In this paper, we consider two stochastic social network game models （a） and （b） which can be defined respectively by two different utility functions. Some sufficient con- ditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium （NE） of the two network game models are obtained by analyzing the different effort relation between a player and his （or her） neighbors.It is known that somebody＇s behavior （decision） in a stochastic social net- work may be influenced by that of his （or her） friends. In this paper, we consider two stochastic social network game models （a） and （b） which can be defined respectively by two different utility functions. Some sufficient con- ditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium （NE） of the two network game models are obtained by analyzing the different effort relation between a player and his （or her） neighbors.

关 键 词：degree distribution utility function Nash equilibrium 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]