BOT模式下的收费道路定价的重复博弈分析  

Repeated Game Analysis on Toll Road Pricing under a BOT Scheme

作　　者：肖海燕 

机构地区：[1]湖北第二师范学院数学与经济学院

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2018年第5期265-270,共6页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：湖北省自然科学基金(2015CFC883)

摘　　要：通过对交通BOT项目中私营公司之间的博弈分析，建立了囚徒困境博弈模型．为了走出囚徒困境，引入重复博弈进行分析，并将一次博弈扩展至重复博弈模型，通过求解得到私营公司合作策略稳定运行的条件．由于私营公司在进行博弈时，可能会“犯错误”，然后建立了颤抖效应的重复博弈模型，通过证明得到了这种情况下私营公司进行合作的条件．从长期看，收费道路之间的完全的自由竞争并不能实现利润最大化，双方均会采取触发策略，以期能长期合作实现利润最大化．In this article, we established the prisoner＇s dilemma game model of two private companies in the traffic BOT project. In order to get out of the prisoner＇s dilemma, we introduced the repeated game,extended the one time game to the repeated games, and obtained the stable operation condition of the cooperation strategy. Because the private company would make mistakes, we established the shaking effect of repeated games model and proved the cooperation conditions. In the long run, the private company can not realize the profit maximization through the completely free competition. Both private companies will adopt trigger strategy, hoping to long-term cooperation to achieve profit maximization.

关 键 词：BOT 收费道路 重复博弈 颤抖效应 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F542