互惠性偏好视角下PPP项目社会资本的控制权分配模型  

Allocation model of private sectors' control rights in PPP from perspective of reciprocal preference

作　　者：张云华[1,2] 丰景春[1,2,3,4] 李明 张可[1,3] 杨圣涛[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京211100 [2]河海大学项目管理研究所,南京211100 [3]河海大学国际河流研究中心,南京211100 [4]江苏省"世界水谷"与水生态文明协同创新中心,南京211100

出　　处：《控制与决策》2018年第3期514-520,共7页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14AZD024;15CJL023;17BGL156);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2014B09014;2015B08214;2013B15020062);教育部创新团队项目(IRT13062);江苏省水利工程PPP项目机制创新与政策建议研究项目(2015097)

摘　　要：现有公私合作制(public-private partnership,简称PPP)项目控制权分配模型大多假设社会资本为自利性经济人,忽略了其互惠性偏好.为此,将互惠性偏好植入社会资本协同产出效用,研究并构建PPP项目社会资本的控制权分配模型.结果表明:社会资本的最优控制权分配范围与互惠性偏好、投入成本正相关,与协同合作程度负相关;考虑互惠性偏好时,控制权份额对社会资本的投入水平和协同产出水平都具有突出的促进作用;同时,控制权限定在一定范围内才有促进作用,独占或过度的控制权会导致投入无效率.Most allocation model of control rights in the existing public-private partnership（PPP） projects assumes that private sector is self-serving economic man, ignoring its reciprocal preference. Therefore, through inplanting reciprocal preference into cooperation output effect of private sector, this paper studies and builds the allocation model of control rights of private sector in PPP projects. The results show that the optimal allocation range of control rights of private sector has a positive correlation with reciprocal preference input cost while a negative correlation with cooperation degree.When taking reciprocal preference into consideration, the share of control rights has a prominent role in promoting the input level of private sector and the output level of cooperation. At the sametime, only being limited in a certain range can the control rights have such effect. Exclusive or excessive control rights will lead to inefficiency of input.

关 键 词：公私合作制 社会资本 控制权 互惠性偏好 协同产出 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学]