转型期政府官员滥用职权行为与国家审计监督力度——基于委托代理理论的研究  

The Abuse of Public Power and National Audit Strength during the Transition Period: A Research Based on Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：向洪金 朱晨之 徐鹏杰[3] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学政府审计学院,江苏南京211815 [2]南京审计大学经济与贸易学院,江苏南京211815 [3]聊城大学商学院,山东聊城252000

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2018年第2期10-18,共9页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71473082);江苏省"333高层次人才培养工程";南京审计大学政府审计研究基金(GAS161029)

摘　　要：基于当前我国腐败与反腐败的基本现实,综合博弈论与信息经济学的有关理论,构建委托代理模型,首先深入剖析薪酬待遇、离职后预期收益、审计监督和惩罚力度影响我国政府公职人员滥用职权行为的机理,然后利用成本-收益方法分析政府审计监督最优力度的决定,在此基础上进一步探讨政府公职人员权力寻租收入和离职后再就业的预期收益对我国政府审计监督最优力度的影响。Based on the reality of China＇s market economy reform and the theory of game theory and information economics,this paper first constructs a principal-agent model to analyze the impacts of remuneration,punishment and national audit on the abuses of government officials. Then,the paper analyzes how officials＇ rent-seeking income and expected return of after-resign on the optimal strength of national audit in China by using the cost-benefit method. The main conclusions as follows： Firstly,external factors such as remuneration,punishment,audit and supervision,rent-seeking income and expected earnings afterservice all affect government officials＇ abuse of public power. Secondly,the optimal audit strengthen of the government depends on the cost of government supervision,the grade of the officials,and the other factors.

关 键 词：公共权力 国家审计 委托代理模型 权力寻租 监督力度 政府审计 国家治理 审计监督 

分 类 号：F239.44[经济管理—会计学]