资本结构与员工劳动生产率  

Debt and employee productivity: Evidences from Chinese listed firms

作　　者：李广众[1] 叶敏健 郑颖[1] LI Guang-zhong, YE Min-jian, ZHENG Ying(Business School, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, Chin)

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广州510275

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2018年第2期1-15,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772190;71372148);国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(16ZDA012);中山大学高校基本科研业务费优秀青年教师重点培育项目

摘　　要：债务作为重要的公司治理手段,可以降低企业、管理层与员工之间的委托代理成本,提高员工劳动生产率.同时,债务水平上升将提高企业破产风险,对企业和员工的人力资本投入与员工劳动生产率可能产生不利影响.以我国1999年~2014年工业企业上市公司为样本,本文不同估计方法的实证结果均表明企业的债务水平越高,员工劳动生产率越低.在其他因素不变的情况下,企业的财务困境加剧了债务对员工劳动生产率的不利影响;债务对员工劳动生产率的负作用在人力资本依赖度高的公司以及在外部就业环境好的地区更加显著.对于债务与员工劳动生产率作用的中介效应分析与分位数回归结果也说明债务上升可能导致企业人力资本投资下降,对员工劳动生产率产生不利影响.研究为我国"去杠杆"经济政策提供了微观企业层面的经验证据.As an important corporate governance device, debt reduces agency problems among owners, managers, and employees, and improves employee productivity. In the meanwhile, debt may increase bankrupt risk, human capital investment and employee productivity. Using a panel of the listed manufacturing companies in China spanning from 1999-2014, the paper finds that debt reduces employee productivity. The subsam- ple analysis finds that, ceteris paribus, financial distress strengthens the negative effect of debt on employee productivity, and the negative effect is more significant in companies that are more dependent on human cap- ital and in companies located in areas with better outside employment environments. Our paper suggests that the agency cost of debt will induce underinvestment of human capital, which depresses employee productivity. Our research provides empirical evidences for the ＂Deleveraging＂ policy in China.

关 键 词：债务比率 员工劳动生产率 人力资本投资 

分 类 号：F242[经济管理—劳动经济] F275[经济管理—国民经济]