论专利侵权诉讼的失范现象及其治理  

Research on the Anomie in Patent Infringement Litigation and Its Governance

作　　者：朱雪忠 彭祥飞 Zhu Xue-zhong, Peng Xiang-fei(Shanghai International College of Intellectual Property of Tongji University, Shanghai 20009)

机构地区：[1]同济大学上海国际知识产权学院,上海200092

出　　处：《政法论丛》2018年第2期61-69,共9页Journal of Political Science and Law

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"促进自主创新能力建设的国家知识产权政策体系研究"(12&ZD073)的研究成果

摘　　要：专利侵权诉讼制度作为一种维护专利制度促进技术创新功能的纠偏机制,近年来日益被异化为攫取不当利益、打击竞争对手的工具。失范理论从个体行为和制度构成两个层面,提供了分析专利侵权诉讼失范现象的视角和方式。个体层面专侵权诉讼的滥用行为,产生于利益最大化原则下行为理性的有限性。制度层面则因专利制度的固有弊端和权利保障失衡产生制度缺位。专利侵权诉讼的失范现象,损害诉讼相对方的合法权益,降低司法公信力和权威,破坏专利制度促进技术创新的机制。建议从明确价值引导、完善事前预防机制和建立针对滥诉的惩罚制度三个方面对专利侵权诉讼的失范现象进行有效治理。As a deviation-rectification mechanism maintaining patent system and promoting technical innovation functions, patent infringement litigation in recent years has been misused as a tool to rake in improper interest and attack on competitors. The anomie theory provides the perspective and method in which the anomie in patent infringement litigation should be analyzed from two levels, i.e. individual behaviors and systems. The abuse of patent infringement litigation at the individual behavior level results from the limitation of behavior rationality under the principle of interest maximization, while that at the system level results from the lack of corresponding systems due to inherent disadvantages and rights protection imbalance. Anomie in patent infringement litigation harms the legal rights and interests of litigation eounterparties, impairs judicial credibility and authority, and damages the mechanism of patent system-driven technical innovations. It is suggested to impose effective governance on the anomie in patent infringement litigation by clarifying value guidance, perfecting beforehand prevention mechanism and establishing penalty systems specific to the abuse of litigation.

关 键 词：失范 专利侵权诉讼 诉讼滥用 滥诉治理 

分 类 号：DF523[政治法律—民商法学]