航运安全监管的多方博弈分析  

Analysis on Multi-parties Game in Shipping Safety Supervision

作　　者：张丽丽 吕靖[2] ZHANG Li-li1, LV Jing2(1. College of International Business, Shandong Jiaotong University, Weihai 264300, China ;2. College of Transportation Management, Dalian Marine University, Dalian 116026, Chin)

机构地区：[1]山东交通学院国际商学院,山东威海264200 [2]大连海事大学交通运输管理学院,辽宁大连116026

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2018年第6期169-179,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：山东交通学院博士科研启动金资助项目

摘　　要：为研究航运安全监管的影响因素及其内在机理，利用博弈理论构建政府监管部门与航运企业、航运企业与船员之间的多方非合作博弈模型，求解与分析模型的纯策略和混合策略纳什均衡．研究结果表明，政府部门对航运企业的监管成本、监管力度、惩罚力度，航运企业对船员的伤亡补偿标准、惩罚力度以及船员的操作成本等因素对博弈均衡产生重要影响，进而影响航运安全．最后据此给出航运安全监管的对策与建议，为我国航运安全监管制度的建设和发展提供理论依据．In order to study the influencing factors and the internal mechanism of shipping safety supervision, this paper constructs the multi-parties non-cooperative game model between the government department and the shipping enterprise, the shipping enterprise and the crew, and then solves and analyses the pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilib- rium of the model. The results show that, the supervision costs, supervision strength and punishment of government departments on shipping companies have an important impact on game equilibrium, so as the compensation standards for casualties, punishment strength of shipping companies on crewmen. These factors affect the shipping safety. Finally, it puts forward suggestions on shipping safety supervision, which provides a theoretical basis for the construction and development of China＇s shipping safety supervision system.

关 键 词：航运 安全监管 博弈 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：U698[交通运输工程—港口、海岸及近海工程]