蒯因整体论的二律背反  

Antinomies in Quinean Holism

作　　者：夏国军[1] XIA Guojun(School of Humanities, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, 20043)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学人文学院,上海200433

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2018年第4期112-119,共8页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：蒯因的整体论是经验论发展史上的一个里程碑,但其中不乏自相矛盾之处。比如,第一,蒯因整体论提出的一个重要前提是他对卡尔纳普关于分析—综合的区分的否定,但蒯因一方面表示要对一般意义上的分析性概念进行批判,而另一方面他实际上批判的只是卡尔纳普的第二种分析性概念。第二,蒯因的整体论应该与基础论格格不入,但他对观察句的偏爱及理论角色定位却使他的整体论留下了基础论的残余。第三,在真理理论上,蒯因的整体论应该接纳的是真理的融贯论,但是他同时还接纳了具有鲜明符合论特征的塔尔斯基的真理理论,等等。不过,这些矛盾不宜简单批判或否定,因为任何形而上学家的学说都存有特定的矛盾,因此,他们不可避免的矛盾一方面成为解读他们哲学的重要入口,另一方面在某种程度上是他们智慧之光的闪现。Although Quinean holism is a landmark in the history of empiricism, there are some selfcontradictions in it. For instance, firstly, a main premise for putting forward Quinean holism is to deny Camap＇s division about analysis-synthesis, but Quine on the one hand says that he intends to criticize the concept of general analyticity, while on the other hand what he actually criticizes is Carnap＇s second concept of analyticity. Secondly, Quinean holism should reject foundationalism, but he prefers the observation sentence and let it play an important theoretic part so that there remain remnants of foundationalism. Thirdly, Quinean holism should accept the coherence theory of truth, but it at the same time accepts Tarski＇s theory of truth that has distinct characteristic of the correspondence theory. Nevertheless, we should not criticize or deny these contradictions in a simplistic manner, because any metaphysician＇s doctrine has special contradictions. These evitable contradictions can become important entrance to reading their philosophy, and at the same time they represent the flash of the light of their wisdom.

关 键 词：蒯因 整体论 二律背反 分析性 观察句 基础论 融贯论 符合论 连续论 

分 类 号：B152[哲学宗教—世界哲学]