关系型税收优惠与税收政策的有效性:隐性税收视角  

Relation-based Tax Preference and Effectiveness of Tax Policy:Implicit Tax Perspective

作　　者：陈运森[1] 孟庆玉 袁淳[1] Chen Yunsen et al.

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,100081

出　　处：《会计研究》2018年第2期41-47,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71572209);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金;中央财经大学第四批科研创新团队计划;中央财经大学"青年英才"培育支持计划(QYP1702)资助

摘　　要：本文从隐性税收视角研究关系型税收优惠对税收政策有效性的干扰。结果显示:基于隐性税收的有效性检验发现税收优惠政策能够吸引资本的自由流入,体现了政府税收目标;但具有地方政府政治关系的企业享受了垄断性税收优惠,削弱了税收的宏观调控功能。基于2008年地方税收优惠制定权收归中央的企业所得税改革的政策检验发现,关系型垄断性税收优惠被打破,地方政府政治关系无法继续发挥作用,税改后各公司的隐性税收趋同,市场竞争与税收环境公平化。上述变化还因公司所处行业和地区的不同而有所差异。结论表明隐性税收可以作为中央税收政策有效性的检验,地方税收优惠权收归中央的改革使得关系型税收优惠程度被弱化,有利于税收的宏观调控作用发挥。From the prospect of implicit tax, this paper studies the influence of the relational tax preference on the effectiveness of the tax policy. U- sing the corporate income tax reform which brings the local tax preferential right under the control of the central government in 2008 to do the DID test, we find that the monopolistic tax preference based on local government relationship was broken because the political relationship doesn＇t work after the tax re- form. It makes companies have the same extent of implicit tax. After the reform of local tax preferential right centralization, the monopolistic tax prefer- ence based on local government relationship is eliminated and the macro-control ability of the tax policy takes effect.

关 键 词：隐性税收 税收优惠 产业政策 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]