绿色供应链中政府补贴策略及效果分析  

Government Subside Policies and Effect Analysis in Green Supply Chain

作　　者：温兴琦[1] 程海芳[2] 蔡建湖[3] 卢超 WEN Xingqi;CHENG Haifang;CAI Jianhu;LU Chao(Wuhan University, Wuhan, China;Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China;Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou, China)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院 [2]华中科技大学管理学院 [3]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2018年第4期625-632,共8页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572184)

摘　　要：考虑消费者绿色偏好,构建基于3种政府补贴策略的绿色供应链成员之间Stackelberg博弈模型,通过理论证明和数值仿真,比较分析在相同的政府补贴支出条件下不同补贴策略的补贴效果。研究表明,绿色偏好系数和投入成本系数的变化不影响3种补贴策略的优劣排序;分别以产品绿色度、制造商利润和零售商利润为政府补贴策略评价标准,对应的最优策略分别是投入成本补贴策略、生产成本补贴策略和绿色度补贴策略;政府补贴系数的变化不影响产品绿色度和制造商利润在3种补贴策略下的大小排序,但对零售商的利润排序有影响。Based on the government subsidy policies,this paper establishes three Stackelberg game models by considering consumer＇s green preferences in green supply chain.The subsidy effects of those policies under the condition of same government expenditure are compared and analyzed through theoretical proof and numerical simulation.The results show that the changes of green preference coefficient and input cost coefficient have no impact on the rankings of the three kinds of subsidy policies;if the green degree of product,the manufacturer＇s profit and the retailer＇s profit are used as the evaluation standards for those policies,then the corresponding optimal subsidy policies are the policies based on the input costs,the production cost and the green degree,respectively.The changes of government subsidy coefficients have no impact on the rankings of the green degree of product and the manufacturer＇s profit under the three kinds of subsidy policies,but have impact on the ranking of the retailer＇s profits.

关 键 词：绿色供应链 政府补贴 绿色度 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]