董事轮换制增加了公司的代理成本吗?  

Does Staggered Board Election Increase Company's Agency Cost?

作　　者：陈玉罡[1] 杨元君 刘彧 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275 [2]中国银监会新疆监管局,新疆乌鲁木齐830000

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2018年第4期35-41,59,共8页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"公司章程中投资者保护条款的采用动机和经济后果研究"(71372147);中山大学重大项目和前沿新兴交叉学科培育资助计划"大数据环境下互联网高成长企业的并购行为研究"(17wkjz03)

摘　　要：本文选取我国沪深两市A股所有上市公司2002~2013年共12年的数据对董事轮换制与公司代理成本之间的关系进行了研究。研究结果表明:(1)是否采用董事轮换制,对于公司代理成本有显著正向的影响,即在公司章程中采用董事轮换制的公司比没有采用该条款的公司代理成本更高,这是因为,董事轮换制为管理层构建堑壕提供了便利;(2)对于在公司章程中采用了董事轮换制的公司,其董事轮换比例对公司代理成本有显著负向的影响,这是因为董事轮换比例越低,收购方获得控制权的难度越大,管理层挖掘的堑壕越难以逾越。This paper gathers A-share corporations＇ data （from 2002 to 2013） as samples, trying to find out the relationship between staggered board election and agency cost with quantitative analysis and empirical study. The result shows that： （1） companies adopting staggered board election have higher agency cost. The reason may be that staggered board election protects the managers so that they build entrenchment easily, which harms the shareholders; （2） the rotation ratio of directors within companies adopting staggered board election is negatively correlated with agency cost. Higher ratio increases the number of directors that can be replaced within a year, so that managers may confront the pressure of taking-over market and restrain their opportunistic behaviors, lowering down the agency cost.

关 键 词：董事轮换制 代理成本 反收购 堑壕效应 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]