公交乘客福利补贴及公交企业运营管制  

Subsidizing public transit riders and regulating transit operators for welfare maximization

作　　者：郭倩雯 李仲飞[1] GUO Qianwen;LI Zhongfei(Business School, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China)

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2018年第4期994-1002,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金博士启动项目(2016A030310223);广东省自然科学基金研究团队项目(2014A030312003);国家自然科学基金(71601192,71721001);中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目(2017T100655)~~

摘　　要：优先发展城市公共交通是缓解交通拥堵、提高政府基本公共服务水平的必然要求，也是构建资源节约型、环境友好型社会的战略选择．由于公交运营的专业性及特殊性，科学合理地对公交企业进行管制以及对公交出行者进行补贴是保障公交行业健康发展、提升社会整体福利的重要手段．本论文拟探讨政府该如何结合企业管制与用户补贴两种手段对垄断型的公共交通市场进行合理干预，从而实现社会福利最大化．本论文提出了面向公交乘客福利的公交管制与补贴的优化模型，并在分析模型性质的情况下对模型结构进行化简，最后给出关于票价、发车间隔及车载能力的解析关系．理论分析和数值计算均显示在补贴资金的社会成本低于临界值时，为公交出行者提供补贴有助于增加消费者剩余及社会福利．It is a strategic choice for China to develop public transportation with priorities, based on the relative relation between available resources and the population to support in cities. Due to the special characteristics of public transit operations, it is an important means to safeguard the healthy development of the public transportation industry and enhance the overall social welfare, through regulating transit operators and subsidizing transit users. This paper intends to explore how the government should combine two means of interventions -- regulation and subsidization to maximize social welfare in a monopolistic market. A mathematical programming model is proposed for public transit regulation and subsidization, after which the model＇s structure is simplified. Key analytical relations about fare, headway, and vehicle capacity are identified, which are supported numerically and theoretically. It is shown that it is welfare- improving to subsidize transit users only when the cost of subsidy is below a threshold,

关 键 词：公共交通 补贴 管制 乘客 社会福利 

分 类 号：U-9[交通运输工程] F511.0[经济管理—产业经济]