公租房PPP模式的投融资进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Investment and Financing for PPP Mode of Public Rental Housing

作　　者：战松[1] 杨万鹏 ZHAN Song;YANG Wanpeng(School of Management, Shenyang Jianzhu University, Shenyang 110168, China)

机构地区：[1]沈阳建筑大学管理学院,辽宁沈阳110168

出　　处：《沈阳建筑大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第2期186-190,共5页Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science

基　　金：辽宁省经济社会发展立项课题(2016lslktyb-145);沈阳市社会科学界联合会立项课题(SYSK2017-08-04)

摘　　要：运用非对称进化博弈模型理论,根据政府与私人投资者两个参与方之间的利益博弈关系,通过博弈模型对PPP公租房投融资参与方的期望收益进行计算,建立政府与私人投资群体的进化博弈趋势图,从而确定博弈结构进化特性改变的阈值。通过两方博弈的分析结果,提出了政府应积极加大公租房建设的力度,并为公租房建设投资者提供税收上的优惠、货币直接补贴措施和贷款贴息等政策,以期使公租房项目建设中政府和私人投资方实现双赢。This paper applies asymmetric evolutionary game theory according to the game of interest between game two parties involved in the government investment and private trends investors,establishes through the evolutionary PPP of government and private groups the game model public rental the investment evolutionary and the expected financing the participants earnings for calculation so as of to determine characteristics of game change threshold.Through the analysis increase and the game between the two parties,it is proposed provide that the government should actively the public rental subsidy incentives,direct make housing construction,and tax monetary subsidies loan interest projects for public rental and investors so as to the construction of public rental housing the government private investors to achieve a win-win situation.

关 键 词：PPP模式 公租房 投融资 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]