交叉网络外部性、平台异质性与对角兼并的圈定效应  

The cross network externality,platform heterogeneity and the market foreclosure effect of diagonal mergers

作　　者：曲创[1] 刘洪波[1] QU Chuang;LIU Hongbo(School of Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China)

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2018年第2期15-28,共14页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71773064)

摘　　要：对角兼并是一种有别于纵向兼并的特殊兼并模式,虽然形式上类似于纵向兼并,但在双边市场中二者的反竞争效应有很大差异。考察在平台异质性和交叉网络外部性的双重作用下,平台对角兼并行为的市场圈定效应,并对谷歌与Double Click并购案进行剖析。平台异质性程度增强会加强对角兼并对关键性投入品价格上升的作用,交叉网络外部性则会进一步加剧对角兼并对竞争性平台利润的侵蚀,最终形成市场圈定效应。研究结果为针对平台对角兼并行为的反垄断审查提供理论依据。Diagonal merger is a special merger mode that is different from vertical merger. Although diagonal merger looks similar to vertical merger,the anti-competitive effects of them are quite different in two-sided markets. This paper studies the market foreclosure effect of platform diagonal merger under the dual role of platform heterogeneity and crossnetwork externality,and analyzes the merger case of Google-Double Click. The results show that the heterogeneity of the platform will enhance the raising prices effect of diagonal mergers on key inputs,and the cross-network externality will further aggravate the erosion of profits of competitive platforms by diagonal mergers,which finally form the market foreclosure effect.This paper can provide a theoretical basis for antitrust review of diagonal mergers of platforms in two-sided markets.

关 键 词：双边市场 对角兼并 纵向兼并 平台异质性 市场圈定 平台反垄断 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]