大牲畜保险道德风险:比较静态与动态演化分析  

Moral Hazard of Livestock Insurance:Comparing Static and Dynamic Evolution Analysis

作　　者：侯仲凯[1] 丁宇刚 何卓静 HOU Zhongkai;DING yugang;HE Zhuojing(College of Finance and Economics Tibet University, Lhasa 850001;School of Economics Peking University, Beijing100871)

机构地区：[1]西藏大学财经学院,西藏拉萨850001 [2]北京大学经济学院,北京100871 [3]中央财经大学商学院,北京100081

出　　处：《保险研究》2018年第4期43-54,共12页Insurance Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社科研究项目(项目编号:17XZJC790001);西藏自治区自然科学基金青年项目(项目编号:2016ZR-TU-09);西藏自治区哲学社会科学专项资金项目(项目编号:17CJY003);2016西藏大学"中青年队伍建设"资助项目

摘　　要：本文利用西藏牧区的数据,运用静态和动态博弈模型对大牲畜保险道德风险进行研究。静态博弈模型和比较静态分析的结果显示,可以通过降低牧民尽力防护与不尽力防护的成本之差、提高共保比例、对存在违规行为的牧民进行惩罚等措施降低道德风险发生概率。动态博弈模型和演化路径分析结果显示,要想长期让牧民趋于选择尽力防护,需要满足保险公司选择加强监管的边际成本小于牧民选择尽力防护的边际成本。基于以上结论,本文认为在实践中,可以通过多样化大牲畜保险补贴政策、适当提高共保比例、加强牧民风险防范教育以及提升保险公司管理效率等措施来减轻大牲畜保险中的道德风险问题。This paper used static and dynamic game model and data from Tibet pastoral areas to study moral hazard in livestock insurance. According to the static game model and comparative static analysis, we could lower the risk of moral hazard by narrowing the cost gap between herdsmen＇ s adequate versus inadequate protection of livestock, raising the coinsurance ratio, and punishing the herders who violated the rules. According to the dynamic game model and evolution path analysis, in order to let the herders protect their livestock effectively in the long run, the marginal cost of strengthening oversight by insurance companies should be less than the marginal cost of herdsmen choosing to protect livestock effectively. Based on the above conclusions, we argued that, in practice, we could lower the risk of moral hazard in livestock insurance through diversifying livestock insurance subsidies, raising coinsurance ratio, strengthening the herdsmen＇ s risk prevention education and enhancing risk management efficiency of insurance companies.

关 键 词：大牲畜保险 道德风险 博弈模型 比较静态分析 演化路径分析 

分 类 号：F840.66[经济管理—保险]