见危不救行为的博弈论分析  

Game Theory Analysis on the Behavior of Being Impervious to Other Person's Calamity

作　　者：柳洁 邱房贵[1] LIU Jie;QIU Fang-gui(School of Humanity and Law, Wuzhou University, Wuzhou,Guangxi 54300)

机构地区：[1]梧州学院文法学院,广西梧州543000

出　　处：《牡丹江大学学报》2018年第5期46-48,共3页Journal of Mudanjiang University

摘　　要：博弈论的发展,为我们研究道德与法律的本质提供了分析工具。通过运用博弈论的分析方法,可以展现见危不救现象中的道德与法律的博弈,在得出不宜将见危不救行为入罪结论的同时,探求通过完善见义勇为激励机制和风险保障两方面的立法,来促使见危不救者的决策向见义勇为这一最优策略转变,从而推动更多的人积极主动地实施见义勇为,优化社会风气,维护社会和谐稳定。The development of game theory provides an analytical tool for us to study the essence of morality and law. The analysis of game theory can be used to manifest the game of morality and law in the phenomenon of being impervious to other person＇s calamity, drawing the conclusion that it is proper to incriminate the behavior of being impervious to other person＇s calamity. We seek to improve the legislation of incentive mechanism and risk guarantee for never hesitate to do what is right; game theory to urge the transformation of the decision-making of those being impervious to other person＇s calamity to the optimum strategy of acting bravely for a just cause, so as to promote more people to take the initiative to ready to help others for a just cause, optimize the social atmosphere and maintain social harmony and stability.

关 键 词：道德 法律 见义勇为 博弈论 

分 类 号：D920.4[政治法律—法学]