政绩考核与环境治理——基于地方政府间策略互动的视角  

Performance Evaluation and Environmental Governance:From a Perspective of Strategic Interaction between Local Governments

作　　者：张彩云 苏丹妮 卢玲[4] 王勇 Zhang Caiyun;Su Danni;Lu Ling;Wang Yong(Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beij＇ing 100044, China;Cooperative Innovation Center of Socialist Economic Construction with Chinese Characteristics, Tianjin 300071, China;School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;Center of Hubei Cooperative Innovation for Emissions Trading System, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan 430205, China;Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Beijing 100029, China)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院经济研究所,北京100044 [2]中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心,天津300071 [3]南开大学经济学院,天津300071 [4]湖北经济学院碳排放权交易湖北省协同创新中心,湖北武汉430205 [5]环境保护部环境与经济政策研究中心,北京100029

出　　处：《财经研究》2018年第5期4-22,共19页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14AJL007);国家社科基金重大项目(16ZDA002)

摘　　要：在中国式分权下,政绩考核直接影响环境政策的执行效果。文章基于地方政府间环境治理策略互动的视角,首先结合分权理论、政治锦标赛、行政发包制等,提出了政绩考核影响地方政府间环境治理策略互动的假说。在此基础上,采用2003-2014年中国272个地级市的面板数据,通过构建空间面板数据模型研究发现:合理的政绩考核指标和分权体系可以使环境治理向"良性竞争"的方向发展。具体而言,环境绩效指标直接增强了地方政府间"竞相向上"的策略互动;经济绩效指标则减弱了"竞相向上"的策略互动。进一步地,政绩考核与分权相结合对地方政府间策略互动产生影响:严格的环境绩效指标通过事权和财权弱化了"竞相到底"的策略互动,强化了"竞相向上"的策略互动;而经济绩效指标则通过事权和财权强化了"竞相到底"的策略互动,弱化了"竞相向上"的策略互动。文章据此提出的政策启示是:环境治理须"联防联控",合理设定政绩考核指标,且配之以合理的分权体系。At present,China＇s environmental problem has become a problem that has to be solved on the road to the healthy development of the economy and society. Under the Chinese style of decentralization,performance evaluation becomes an important factor affecting the implementation of environmental policies.Based on the strategic interaction among local governments,this paper combines the theories of decentralization,administrative subcontract and political tournament,and puts forward relevant hypotheses：the greening of performance assessment helps make good competition between local governments in environmental governance;decentralization affects the relationship between performance appraisal and environmental governance strategic interaction among local governments. This paper uses the panel data of 272 prefecture-level cities in China between 2003 and 2014 to build the spatial Durbin model,and uses maximum likelihood estimation（MLE）to get the results after regression：reasonable performance evaluation index and decentralization system can make environmental governance develop in the direction of ‘benign competition＇. As a whole,the environmental governance between local governments has a strategic interaction of ‘imitative competition＇. Based on political tournament theory,this paper empirically studies the impact of performance assessment on the interaction of environmental governance strategies among cities in China. Results show that environmental performance indicators enhance the strategic interaction of ＂race to the top＂ among cities,and economic performance indicators weaken the ＂race to the top＂ strategic interaction among cities. Furthermore,based on the theories of ＂political tournament＂ and ＂administrative contract＂,we examine the impact of the combination of performance appraisal and decentralization on the strategic interaction between local governments. Environmental performance indicators combined with higher authority can weaken the ＂race to the bottom＂ strategic in

关 键 词：政绩考核 地方政府间策略互动 环境治理 空间杜宾模型 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]