风险厌恶下制造企业在服务外包中的协调决策研究  

Coordination in the Risk-averse Service Outsourcing of Manufacturing Enterprises

作　　者：肖吉军[1] 师亚玲 郑颖琦 XIAO Ji-jun;SHI Ya-ling;ZHENG Ying-qi(Guilin University Of Electronic Technology, GuangXi 541004, China)

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学商学院

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2018年第9期30-40,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：桂林市科学研究与技术开发计划项目(2016013602);国家自然科学基金项目(71162017);广西高校中青年教师基础能力提升项目(KY2016YB156);桂林电子科技大学研究生创新项目(2017YJCX65)

摘　　要：服务外包过程中，市场需求的不确定性会产生订单误判的风险，供应的随机性则会造成缺货的风险．为了减少此类风险对服务外包产生的影响，构建基于CVaR风险度量准则的Stackelberg博弈模型，模型由一个风险厌恶的制造企业和一个风险中性的生产性服务企业组成，分析得出在分散决策时的均衡订货与定价决策，并构建了带有收益分享与缺货惩罚的协调契约．通过分析得出，均衡订货与定价决策可使制造企业的条件风险价值取得最小值，同时生产性服务企业的期望收益获得最大；制造企业的订货数量受到风险厌恶水平的影响，依据生产性服务企业的缺货数量收取罚金，并向其共享一部分收益，可以完成服务外包的协调，生产性服务企业的定价策略会制约协调契约的参数取值，而风险厌恶程度又影响定价策略的制定．In the service outsourcing, the uncertainty from the demand brings in the risk of wrong ordering, and the uncertainty from the supply results in the risk of shortage. In order to reduce the losses from these risks, this paper models a Stackelberg game between a risk-averse manufacturing enterprises and a risk-neutral productive service enterprises to get the equilibrium pricing and ordering, based on conditional value-at-risk. Finally, a contract combining shortage penalty revenue sharing is proposed to coordinate the service outsourc- ing. The results show that the equilibrium pricing and ordering can minimize the conditional value-at-risk of the manufacturing enterprises, and maximize the expected profit of the pro- ductive service enterprises. The risk aversion can affect the order quantity. The service outsourcing can be coordinated when the order is improved by the way that manufactur- ing enterprises penalizes the productive service enterprises for the shortage and shares a part of revenue with them. The parameters enterprises＇ s pricing which is affected by the of contract depend on the productive service manufacturing enterprises ＇ s aversion to risk.

关 键 词：服务外包 博弈 风险厌恶 条件风险价值 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济]