基于系统动力学的跨境物流联盟运作风险演化博弈  

Evolutionary Game of Operational Risk of Cross-border Logistics Alliance based on System Dynamics

作　　者：杜志平[1] 付帅帅 王丹丹[1] DU Zhi-ping;FU Shuai-shuai;WANG Dan-dan(Logistics Institute, Beifing Wuzi University , Belting 101149, China)

机构地区：[1]北京物资学院物流学院,北京101149

出　　处：《商业研究》2018年第4期68-77,共10页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然基金面上项目"基于云平台技术跨境物流联盟运作机制与决策优化研究";项目编号:71772016

摘　　要：针对跨境物流联盟特征和系统运作风险控制问题,通过对跨境物流联盟运作过程进行分析,识别其运作风险并建立运作风险指标体系,从跨境物流联盟内企业选择策略行为博弈视域对联盟内企业的决策行为进行博弈分析,建立联盟内部惩罚机制下的演化博弈模型,结合系统动力学仿真跨境物流联盟演化稳定路径,探究影响联盟运作因素变化时联盟内企业选择策略的变化情况,结果表明,为有效规避联盟运作风险,需要建立科学的惩罚机制,防范联盟内部成员的投机行为。Based on the characteristics of cross-border logistics alliance and operational risk control of the system,and by analyzing the operation process of cross-border logistics alliance,the paper identifies its operational risk and establishes an operational risk index system. From the perspective of the game behavior of enterprise selection strategy in the cross-border logistics alliance,it analyzes the decision-making behavior of the enterprises within the alliance by means of game analysis,establishes an evolutionary game model under the internal penalty mechanism of the alliance,and simulates the evolutionary stability path of the cross-border logistics alliance with system dynamics to study the changes in the selection strategy of the alliance within the alliance when operating factors affect the operation of the alliance. Research shows that in order to effectively evade the operational risk of the alliance,a scientific punishment mechanism needs to be established to prevent speculation within the alliance.

关 键 词：跨境物流联盟 演化博弈 系统动力学 运作风险 

分 类 号：F253.9[经济管理—国民经济]