政府约束机制下农产品质量安全监管三方演化博弈及仿真分析  

Three-party Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis on Agricultural Product Quality Safety Supervision under the Condition of Government Constraints Mechanism

作　　者：朱立龙 郭鹏菲[1] ZHU Li-long1,2 ,GUO Peng-fei1(1. School of Business,Shandong Normal University,Ji＇nan 250014 ,China 2. School of Management,Shandong University,Ji＇nan 250100,Chin)

机构地区：[1]山东师范大学商学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第12期75-80,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金规划项目(17YJA630147);山东省社会科学规划项目(16CQXJ03);山东师范大学教学改革研究项目(2016JG60)

摘　　要：引入政府约束机制,构建了政府监管部门、农产品生产加工企业、第三方检测机构之间的三方演化博弈模型,分析了三个行为主体的演化过程,探讨了不同主体之间策略选择的相互影响以及参数变化对各个主体策略选择的影响,求解了演化稳定均衡解,并运用Matlab 2016b进行了仿真分析。结果表明:惩罚力度、寻租收益、寻租成本是分别影响政府监管部门、农产品生产加工企业和第三方检测机构演化稳定策略的关键因素。并提出了提高农产品质量安全的对策与措施,为改善农产品质量安全水平指明了方向。This paper introduces government constraints mechanism,constructs three-side evolutionary game model between government,agricultural production and processing enterprises and the third-party testing organization,analyzes the mutual influence of the strategy selection among different subjects and the influence of parameter change on each subject strategy selection,and solves the evolutionary stability equilibrium solution of each subject strategy selection,using Matlab 2016 bto simulate the stability strategy of the three actors in the specific parameter change.Finally,we give some suggestions and solutions to improve agricultural product quality,which points out the direction of improving the quality and safety level of agricultural products.

关 键 词：政府约束 农产品质量安全 质量监管 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济] F224