辛普森悖论——逻辑进路和因果进路之争  

Simpson's Paradox: Clash of Logic-based Account and Causal Account

作　　者：吴小安 WU Xiaoan(Department of Philosophy, Capital Normality University, Beijing, 100086)

机构地区：[1]首都师范大学哲学系,北京100086

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2018年第5期53-59,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：有两种关于辛普森悖论的解释,逻辑-基础的解释和因果的解释。前一个解释为哲学家普拉桑塔·班德亚帕德耶所坚持,后一种解释为计算机科学家朱迪亚·珀尔所主张。班德亚帕德耶在他近几年的文章中,强调有三个关于辛普森悖论的问题需要得到充分的分析才能够说明这个悖论得到了解决:1.辛普森悖论为什么是悖论;2.辛普森悖论是在什么条件下产生的;3.遇到辛普森悖论该如何做?第三个问题他服膺珀尔的方法,认为因果性只会在第三个问题有作用,但是前两个问题他认为珀尔的解释都错了,应该给予逻辑-基础的解释。在这一篇文章中,我试图证明哲学家班德亚帕德耶对珀尔前两个问题及相关因果解释的批评都是不正确的,且他自己的逻辑-基础的解释也可商榷。There are two kinds of accounts（logic-based and causal） of Simpson＇s paradox. one from philosopher Bandyoapdhyay, the other from computer scientist Judea Pearl. Bandyoapdhyay tried to show that there are three questions associated with Simpson＇s paradox that need adequate analysis：（i） Why is SP paradoxical？（ii） What conditions generate SP？（iii） How to proceed when confronted with SP？ Developing a logic-based account of SP, he tried to argue that there are no causal factors at play in answering questions（i） and（ii）. Causality enters only in the third question. Comparing with these two accounts, I prove that Bandyoapdhyay＇s criticism of Pearl is not correct, his account of SP also faces many problems.

关 键 词：do-演算 后门准则 可交换性 可坍塌性 因果性 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]