基于演化博弈理论的农村客运服务供给行为分析  

Analysis on Supply Behavior of Rural Passenger Transport Service Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：葛晓鹏 张艺[2] 赵晋宇[2] GE Xiao-peng1, ZHANG Yi2, ZHAO Jin-yu2(1. Sehool of Economies and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2. Transport Planning and Researeh Institute, Ministry of Transport, Beijing 100028, Chin)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]交通运输部规划研究院,北京100028

出　　处：《公路交通科技》2018年第5期151-158,共8页Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development

摘　　要：为进一步提高农村客运服务供给的针对性和有效性,不断改善农村客运服务供给质量,需对农村客运服务供给过程中相关主体的决策行为进行深入研究。农村客运服务供给涉及政府、企业和公众等3类利益相关主体,虽然政府处于"元治理"地位,但是农村客运服务的最终供给方式和供给效果均受三者博弈行为影响。基于参与人的有限理性和参与人之间信息不对称的基本假设,采用演化博弈理论,构建政府、企业和公众三者之间的效益模型,寻求社会福利最大化条件下的演化稳定均衡。研究结果表明:(1)政府在促进三方博弈均衡的过程中主导作用明显,其补贴决策会对企业生产行为和公众决策行为产生极大影响;(2)企业以追求利益最大化为目标,政府增加补贴可以提高企业的期望收益;(3)公众以自身效用最大化为标准选择具体出行方式,而公众对于效用的识别和衡量来源于其基于自身状况的主观判断;(4)即使政府通过对农村客运服务的补贴可以增进社会福利,但并不代表政府选择了最优的农村客运服务供给方式。同时,研究提出引入市场机制遴选农村客运生产企业、通过凭单制给予公众更大选择权、加大政府财政补贴力度、加强事中事后监管等政策建议。In order to strengthen the pertinence and effectiveness of rural passenger transport service（ RPTS）provision,and improve the quality of RPTS provision,it is necessary to conduct in-depth research on the decision-making behavior of related stakeholders in the process of RPTS provision. The RPTS provision involves 3 stakeholders,including government,enterprises and public. Although the government acts as＂domination governance＂,the ultimate supply mode and supply effect of RPTS are determined by the game behaviors of the 3 stakeholders. Based on the assumption of the limited rationality of participants and the information asymmetry among participants,a benefit model among 3 stakeholders is built with the evolutionary game theory to seek the steady and gradual equilibrium under the condition of maximizing social welfare. The research result shows that（ 1） the government plays a dominant role in the process of promoting the game equilibrium of the 3 stakeholders,and the subsidy decision would have a great impact on the enterprises＇ production behavior and the public ＇ s decision-making behavior;（ 2） enterprises aim at pursuing the maximization of profits. and the expected benefits would be increased with more government subsidies;（ 3）the public selects the specific travel mode for the maximization of their own utility,and their identification and measurement of utility derived from the subjective judgment of their own conditions;（ 4） even though the government promotes social welfare by subsidizing RPTS,it dose not mean that the government has chosen the optimal supply mode of RPTS. Furthermore,several policy suggestions are put forward,including the introduction of market mechanism to select rural passenger transport enterprises,the introduction of voucher system to provide the public more choice, strengthening government financial subsidies, strengthening supervision in the course and afterwards.

关 键 词：运输经济 供给行为 演化博弈理论 农村客运服务 社会福利最大化 

分 类 号：F542[经济管理—产业经济]