高管激励契约组合对研发投入的影响  

On Impact of Executives' Incentive Contract Combinations on R&D Investment

作　　者：谢会丽[1] 沈栋昌 蒋巍[1] XIE Hui-li;SHEN Dongchang;JIANG Wei(School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018, China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《杭州电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第2期21-26,32,共7页Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University：Social Sciences

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地课题(14XXHJD02YB);浙江省教育厅科研项目(Y201326559);杭州市哲学社会科学规划课题(M16JC046)

摘　　要：文章以2012-2016年A股上市公司为研究样本,研究了上市公司高管激励的多种途径及其组合关系对研发投入的影响。研究发现:高管短期薪酬激励、股权激励促进了企业的研发投入;高管的晋升激励在一定程度上阻碍了企业的研发投入。另外,在企业研发投入的过程中,高管短期薪酬激励与高管股权激励之间呈现显著的互补关系;高管晋升激励对短期薪酬激励和股权激励产生一定的替代效应,削弱了短期薪酬激励和股权激励的效果。Based on the observation of A-share listed companies in 2012-2016 years,this paper studies the impact of various executives＇ incentive ways and their combinations on the RD investment. It is found that the executives＇ short-term compensation incentive and the stock-based compensation promote the RD enterprises＇ input; the promotion incentive of the executives hinders the RD investment of enterprises to some extent. In addition,in the process of enterprises＇ innovation,there is a significant complementary relationship between executives＇ short-term compensation incentive and the stock-based compensation; the executives＇ promotion incentive has a certain substitution effect on the short-term incentive and the stock-based compensation,and weakens the effect of the short-term compensation incentives and the stock-based compensations as well.

关 键 词：高管 短期薪酬激励 股权激励 晋升激励 研发投入 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]