停车泊位共享收益分配研究——基于不完全信息讨价还价博弈模型  

Research on shared income allocation of parking berths——Bargaining Game Model based on incomplete Information

作　　者：彭勇[1] 李新新[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学交通运输学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2018年第2期67-70,共4页Price:Theory & Practice

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(17YJA630079)

摘　　要：合理分配泊位共享收益能促进泊位共享,从而缓解停车泊位供不应求的问题。随着互联网＋的发展,泊位共享平台成为实施泊位共享的主力军,优化其收益更能促进泊位共享的实施。本文以得到合理分配泊位共享收益分配及平台最优收益为目标,建立不完全信息泊位共享收益分配三方讨价还价动态博弈模型,得到模型纳什均衡解,并得出平台最优收益值。案例分析表明：平台的总收益不仅受自身单个泊位收益的影响,而且受小区居民不同特性的影响。The reasonable allocation of berth share income can promote berth sharing, thus alleviate the problem that parking berth is in short supply.With the development of Internet ＋, berth sharing platform becomes the main force of berth sharing, and optimizing its income can promote the implementation of berth sharing.In this paper, aiming at obtaining reasonable allocation of berths＇ shared income and platform＇s optimal income, the dynamic game model of three-party bargaining of disposition of incomeof berth sharing with incomplete information is established, and the Nash equilibrium solution of the model is obtained and the optimal income value of the platform is obtained.Case study shows that the total income of the platform is affected not only by its own single berth income, but also by the different characteristics of community residents.

关 键 词：停车管理 停车泊位共享 收益分配 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F299.24