社会融合背景下新生代农民工利益抗争过程中的策略选择研究——基于博弈论的视角  

Research on New Generation of Migrant Workers' Strategic Choice in the Process of Struggling for Interests in the Background of Social Integration

作　　者：宋艳[1] 苏子逢 孙典 SONG Yan;SU Zi-feng;SUN Dian(School of Economic and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China)

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2018年第5期49-57,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"城市灾害应急中被疏散者风险感知与应急疏散信息排程耦合机理"(71771061);黑龙江省应用技术研究与开发计划项目"基于产能视角的"龙江陆海丝绸之路经济带"建设对策研究"(GC16D104)

摘　　要：本文从农民工群体与企业利益抗争过程中的策略选择入手,通过决策树和序贯博弈理论与数值仿真的方法,探讨了农民工群体依法维权的相对成本与企业失信的相对违法成本在不同的系统参数下对于农民工利益抗争过程中的策略选择的影响,并探究不同系统参数下农民工群体的均衡策略,提出均衡状态下,系统参数之间应满足的条件关系表达式。研究表明:依法维权的成本过高虽然对农民工群体的策略选择有影响,但并不是导致农民工群体更倾向于选择亲群体性行为的根本原因。提高企业失信违法成本并不会有效的避免农民工群体利益受损,减少农民工群体选择亲群体性行为。亲群体性行为其真正的原因在于体制内维权困难。政府应该减少依法维权的成本,同时应尽量减少群众的"闹大"意识,加强群众依法维权的法律意识。This paper analysis the strategies of migrant workers in the struggle of interests against enterprises.Through the sequential game theory,decision tree and the method of numerical simulation for references,we firstly discuss about how the cost of rights protection in accordance with the law and the illegal cost of enterprise impact on strategy selection under the condition of different system parameters. Secondly,the study finds out the equilibrium strategies of migrant workers for different system parameters. And then we put forward a relational expression to describe the condition that the two system parameters should satisfy. It is shown that the high cost of rights protection could not lead migrant workers more likely to choose the strategy of group behavior. And improving the illegal cost will not be effective to avoid jeopardizing the interests of migrant workers. It is suggested that the government should reduce the cost of rights protection in accordance with the law,and should try to minimize the people＇s awareness of ＂NAO-DA＂. In addition,they need to strengthen the legal consciousness of the people in accordance with the law.

关 键 词：群体性事件 新生代农民工 利益抗争行为 博弈论 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]