伍德沃德和戴维森:解释的因果理论  

James Woodward and Donald Davidson:Causation,Causal Law,and the Interpretative Work

作　　者：周靖 ZHOU Jing(Dewey Center, School of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433 ,Chin)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院杜威中心,上海200433

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2018年第3期35-40,共6页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

摘　　要：戴维森把原因理解为表达了某一共同属性(结构)的语句,伍德沃德则把原因理解为通过对其操作而引起结果变化的变项。两人均因为追问"什么可以充当结果的原因"这一问题而采取解释的视角研究因果理论。在为什么采取解释的起点这一问题上,戴维森的思路是从因果律、真、意义到解释;伍德沃德则不认为解释需要以因果律为基础,他认为解释就是对因果事件的反事实研究,即回答"如果发生的事情不同会怎样"的问题,从中可以提取发现变项的有用信息。在两人的理论中都强调实践的重要性,但需要进一步发展实践维度上的思想才能避免理论中存在的一些问题。Davidson understands cause as expressions about the cause that has one type of qualities. Woodward, comparatively, takes the variables that will influence the outcomes of effect as the cause. They both investigate what qualified causes or variables are, the fact of which leads them to the interpretative route to causal theories. To answer why taking an interpretative starting point, Davidson thinks the explanation is backed by causal laws; however, Woodward is against Davidson＇ s thoughts and he takes interpretation as the eounterfactual investigations into causal statements, which is to answer the ＂what-things-would-happen differently＂ questions. Meanwhile, we will get useful information about what the manipulable variables are. They both emphasize the importance of practice. However, they need to put more weight on it in order to avoid some critiques.

关 键 词：因果性 因果律 解释 操作主义 

分 类 号：G302[文化科学]