上市公司被处罚会牵连未受罚审计师吗?  

Do Regulatory Sanctions for Listed Companies Implicate Unpunished Auditors?

作　　者：钱爱民[1] 朱大鹏[1] 郁智[1] Qian Aimin;Zhu Dapeng;Yu Zhi

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,邮政编码100029

出　　处：《审计研究》2018年第3期63-70,共8页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目批准号:71272041);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(项目批准号:11YJA630085);对外经济贸易大学研究生科研创新基金资助(项目批准号:2017026);中国国家留学基金委资助项目(项目批准号:201706640071)的资助

摘　　要：本文以2007～2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究上市公司被监管机构处罚对未受罚审计师的溢出效应。实证结果显示,上市公司受罚会牵连公司未受罚审计师的个人声誉,导致"牵连"审计师后续审计收费更低。当后续客户是国有上市公司时,上述溢出效应更加显著。进一步分析发现,"牵连"审计师在违规上市公司违规年度所审其他上市公司的审计质量与非"牵连"审计师相比无显著差异。但"牵连"审计师后续所审上市公司更有可能被监管机构处罚。上述研究结果不仅丰富了监管机构违规处罚经济后果的研究,也为政府机构今后进一步完善监管政策提供了有利参考。This paper uses the panel data of A-share listed companies on the Chinese stock markets from 2007 to 2015 and investigates the spillover effect of regulatory sanctions for fraud companies on unpunished auditors. The empirical result shows that regulatory sanctions for fraud companies impair auditors＇ reputation, leading to the decrease in audit fees in the following years, and the spillover effect is more significant when the successive clients are SOEs. Further study finds out that the audit quality of other non-fraud firms audited by implicated auditors has no significant difference with that audited by non-implicated auditors. But firms audited by implicated auditors are more likely to be punished in the future, These conclusions help enrich the research on economic consequences of penalties for corporate fraud and provide useful reference for regulatory policy-making.

关 键 词：违规处罚 溢出效应 审计收费 审计师更换 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]