问题专利、厂商行为与专利制度研究——基于Bertrand竞争的分析  

Research on Questionable Patent,Firm Behavior and Patent System——Analysis Based on the Bertrand Competition

作　　者：方中秀[1] 董亮[2] FANG Zhong-xiu;DONG Liang(School of Economics and Business Administration, Central China Normal University, Wuhan 430079;School of Business, Guilin University of Electronic Technology, Guilin 541004)

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学经济与工商管理学院,武汉430079 [2]桂林电子科技大学商学院,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《软科学》2018年第6期15-20,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71103201);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(231-20205140018);华中师范大学基本科研业务费专项资金(理科)项目(CCNU16A05033)

摘　　要：基于Bertrand竞争前提,通过一个序贯博弈模型分析了不同专利制度下问题专利对各厂商行为的影响。结果表明,在现有专利制度下,专利质量很差的创新厂商也能获取垄断利润,同时规制者能够发挥的作用非常有限。最优专利制度应是一种事前的相机抉择专利侵权赔付机制,规制者必须根据创新厂商研发成本以及市场份额的不同,设计不同的专利侵权赔付金额,以达到弥补创新厂商研发成本以及社会福利最大化的目的。Based on the premise of Bertrand competition, this paper analyzes the effect of questionable patent on related firms under different patent systems through a sequential game model. Results show that even the firms with poor-quality patents could get monopoly profits, and the function of regulators is limited under the current patent system. The optimal patent system should be an ex-ante discretionary mechanism of patent compensation. The regulators should design different compensations for patent infringement according to R＆D cost and market share, therefore innovation cost of firms will be compensated and social welfare be maximized.

关 键 词：问题专利 BERTRAND竞争 厂商行为 专利制度 

分 类 号：F260[经济管理—国民经济]