网络消费市场信用缺失治理之演化博弈分析  

The Evolution Game Analysis on Lacking Credibility of the Network Consumer Market

作　　者：张娟[1] 耿弘[1] 张钦[1] 刘海楠[2] ZHANG Juan;GENG Hong;ZHANG Qin;LIU Hainan(College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing Jiangsu 211106, China;Bussiness School, Shandong Jianzhu University, Ji＇nan Shandong 250014, China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106 [2]山东建筑大学商学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第4期64-71,共8页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目资助(13AZD062);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273130)

摘　　要：网络消费市场信用的研究对于市场交易的繁荣和发展具有重要的意义。针对由网络平台运营商与网络销售商构成的网购系统,构建网络销售商之间的信用关系演化博弈模型,通过模型对网络销售商信用治理进行研究,模型推理显示,不仅各相关参数的变化对网商策略具有一定的影响,而且系统演化过程和系统稳态受系统初始状态的影响。进一步在模型中引入平台运营商监督机制,并运用数据模拟分析,结果表明:相关参数变化对系统的演化方向具有一定的影响,适当引入平台运营商监管机制,可以有效地减少网络销售商的背叛行为,有利于系统向帕勒托稳态方向演化。The research on network consumer market credit has great significance to the prosperity and development of the transaction. To the online shopping system constituted by the network platform operator and E-tailers,we have established credit relationship evolution game model in order to study the credit autonomy among retailers. The change of the relevant parameters has a certain impact on the network strategy,and the evolution and stable state of the system are affected by the initial state of the system.Then introduced the supervision mechanism into model and data simulation analyzed,the results show that the changes of related parameters have certain influence on the system evolution direction. When the supervision and punishment mechanism of the platform operator is introduced appropriately,the betrayal of E-tailers can be effectively reduced,and make the system evolve to a steady Pareto direction.

关 键 词：网络市场 网络零售商 信用缺失 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]