股权激励、产权性质与非效率投资行为  

Equity Incentive, the Nature of Property Right and Inefficient Investment Behavior

作　　者：孟雪莹[1] 宋希亮[2] MENG Xue-ying;SONG Xi-liang

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学管理学院,山东青岛266100 [2]山东财经大学会计学院,济南250014

出　　处：《财务研究》2018年第3期95-103,共9页Finance Research

摘　　要：本文以2011~2016年我国上市公司为样本,探究实施股权激励计划对非效率投资行为的影响,以及不同产权性质、不同激励程度下该影响的差异。研究结果表明:第一,在我国资本市场中,相较于投资过度现象,投资不足问题更为严重。第二,股权激励对投资不足具有显著抑制作用,且投资不足程度越高股权激励抑制作用越显著;股权激励会加剧投资过度行为,且投资过度程度越低股权激励加剧作用越显著。第三,相较于非国有企业,国有企业实施股权激励对非效率投资的影响较弱。This paper takes the listed companies in China from 2011 to 2016 as the sample to research the influence of equity incentive and the degree of equity incentive on the inefficient investment behavior, and the moderating effect of the nature of property right. Through the empirical research, we draw the following conclusions： Firstly, there is inefficient investment in listed companies in China. Compared with overinvestment, underinvestment is more obvious. Secondly, the equity incentive has a significant restraining effect on the underinvestment. At the same time, it is found that the higher the degree of underinvestment is, the more remarkable the restraining effect is. The equity incentive has a significant promoting effect on the overinvestment. Thirdly, this research also finds that compared with state-owned enterprises, the influence of equity incentive implemented by non-state-owned enterprises is more significant.

关 键 词：股权激励 产权性质 非效率投资 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]