日常对象:从科学主义形而上学到常识本体论  

Ordinary Object: From Scientistic Approach to Metaphysics to Common Sense Ontology

作　　者：李主斌[1] LI Zhu - bin(School of Marxism, Shanghai JiaoTong University, Shanghai 200240, Chin)

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学马克思主义学院,上海200240

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2018年第6期3-9,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：上海交通大学青年人才科研能力培育专项项目(16X100040008);国家社科基金重大项目(15ZDB016);国家社科基金青年项目(14CZX013)

摘　　要：(日常)对象在漫长的西方哲学史中一直是其本体论中的基本存在,但近些年来这一立场受到了哲学家们的挑战,人们已经提出了诸多论证以否定日常对象的存在。对于这些论证的争论如今方兴未艾,其中的主要质疑是这些论证往往基于研究形而上学的科学主义立场,而这一立场值得商榷。本文尝试梳理这一争论,并进而试图不基于科学主义立场来提出一个拒斥日常对象存在的论证。Ordinary Objects has always been the basic existence in the ontology of Western Philosophy. This position,however,has been challenged by philosophers in recent years and many arguments have been put forward to deny the existence of ordinary objects. The debate for these arguments are now in the ascendant. The main suspicion is that these arguments are often based on a scientistic approach to metaphysics which is problematic. In this paper,I try to sort out this debate,and then propose an argument to reject the existence of ordinary objects which doesn＇t depend on the scientistic approach to metaphysics.

关 键 词：常识 科学主义形而上学 元形而上学 模糊性 本质 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]