企业内部控制质量与银行借款契约——基于融资成本的视角  

Quality of internal control and bank loan contract——based on the perspective of financing cost

作　　者：张广宝[1,2,3] 周梦鸽[1] 施继坤 ZHANG Guangbao;ZHOU Mengge;SHI Jikun(School of Economics and Management, Northeast Petroleum University, Daqing 163318, China;School of Economics and Management, Hezhou University, Hezhou 542899, China;Postdoctoral Fellowships in Applied Economic Studies, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China)

机构地区：[1]东北石油大学经济管理学院,黑龙江大庆163318 [2]贺州学院经济与管理学院,广西贺州542899 [3]东北财经大学应用经济学博士后流动站,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《辽宁工程技术大学学报（社会科学版）》2018年第2期109-112,共4页Journal of Liaoning Technical University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：东北石油大学青年基金培育项目(py120138);贺州学院博士科研基金项目(HZUBS201603;HZUBS201605);广西中青年教师基础能力提升项目(2017KY0642)

摘　　要：以2011-2014年沪深两市A股(不包括创业板)上市公司为研究样本,从融资成本视角,探讨上市公司内部控制质量与银行借款契约的关系。研究发现:内部控制质量与银行借款成本呈负相关关系,即内部控制质量高的企业获得的银行借款成本更低。研究结论为经济转轨环境下增强企业建立健全内部控制意识、保护债权人利益和促进信贷市场健康发展有政策启示。The relationship between the quality of internal control of listed companies and the contract of bank borrowing is discussed from the perspective of financing cost, taking the case of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock exchanges（excluding the GEM） from 2011 to 2014 as research sample. It is found that the quality of internal control is negatively correlated with the cost of bank borrowing, that is, the cost of bank borrowing with high internal control is lower. The research conclusion has policy implications for enhancing enterprises＇ awareness of internal control, protecting creditors＇ interests and promoting the healthy development of credit market in the context of economic transformation.

关 键 词：内部控制 内部控制质量 银行借款契约 融资成本 

分 类 号：F239.9[经济管理—会计学]