现金股利政策、外部审计与股价未来崩盘风险——基于创业板上市公司经验证据的分析  

Cash Dividend Policy,External Auditing and Stock Price Crash Risk:An Analysis based on Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies on GEM

作　　者：林川[1] 曹国华[2] LIN Chuan;CAO Guo-hua(Research Center for International Business and Economy, Sichuan International Studies University, Chongqing 400031, China;School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China)

机构地区：[1]四川外国语大学国别经济与国际商务研究中心,重庆400031 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《商业研究》2018年第6期25-31,共7页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目;项目编号:71232004;四川外国语大学校级科研一般项目"双重监管视角下中国股票市场安全建设的模式与路径研究";项目编号:sisu201732

摘　　要：基于2010-2016年间中国创业板上市公司的样本数据,本文分析检验现金股利政策对创业板上市公司股价未来崩盘风险的治理作用,并讨论外部审计在现金股利政策替代作用下如何影响现金股利政策与创业板上市公司股价未来崩盘风险之间的关系。研究表明单纯的现金股利政策不能对创业板上市公司股价崩盘风险产生显著的影响,但高质量的外部审计行为能够抑制创业板上市公司股价崩盘的风险;考虑外部审计所产生的中介作用后,现金股利政策对创业板上市公司的股价崩盘风险产生了明显的制约作用,这表明创业板上市公司分配现金股利政策行为更加趋于理性,能够抑制创业板上市公司股价崩盘的风险。Based on the sample data of China＇s listed companies on GEM from 2010 to 2016, this paper analyzes and tests the governance effect of cash dividend policy on stock price crash risk of listed companies on GEM, and discusses how external audit affects the relationship between cash dividend policy and stock price crash risk of listed companies on GEM under the substitution effect of cash dividend policy. Research shows that cash dividend policy alone cannot signifi- cantly affect the stock price crash risk of listed companies on GEM, but high-quality external auditing can inhibit the stock future crash risk of listed companies on GEM ; after considering the intermediary role generated by external audit, the cash dividend policy has obviously restricted the stock price crash risk of listed companies on GEM, which shows that the behavior of listed companies on GEM in distributing cash dividend policy is more rational and can inhibit the stock price crash risk of listed companies on GEM.

关 键 词：股价崩盘风险 现金股利政策 外部审计 创业板上市公司 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]