碳交易规制下信息不对称供应链的减排和低碳推广博弈研究  

Supply Chain's Emission Reduction and Lowcarbon Promotion Policies in Cap-and-trade System: The View of Information Asymmetry

作　　者：夏良杰[1] 白永万 秦娟娟[1] 李友东[2] XIA Liang-jie;Bai Yong-wan;Qin Juan-juan;Li You-dong(School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China;School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot 010021, China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222 [2]内蒙古大学经济管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010021

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2018年第6期37-45,共9页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502123;71302115;71502050);内蒙古自然科学基金(2015MS0709)

摘　　要：论文在碳交易规制下,研究单一制造商和双零售商组成的供应链减排与低碳推广决策以及零售商对制造商的成本信息分享问题,分析了零售商对制造商分享成本信息的条件,及不同情形下的制造商减排和零售商低碳推广策略。研究发现:零售商的最优低碳推广水平只与自身相关参数有关,零售商只有在自身低碳推广效率足够高时才会与制造商分享信息;制造商最优减排量随消费者低碳意识、碳交易价格、零售商低碳推广效率及其不确定性增大而提高,随零售商之间竞争程度提高而降低;无论零售商是否对制造商分享成本信息,供应链成员的最优利润随零售商之间竞争程度提高而增加,随消费者低碳意识、碳交易价格提高而提高;零售商低碳推广效率的不确定性越大则制造商的最优利润越低,零售商的最优利润越高;仅一家零售商分享成本信息时,制造商无法通过转移支付使另一家零售商与其分享信息。Asymmetric information Stackelberg game is proposed for one manufacturer-two retailers supply chain. The emission reduction and low carbon promotion decisions under the cap-and-trade system are explored. The paper investigates the condition under which the retailers will share their low-carbon promotion efficiency information with the manufacturer. Also, the paper analyzes the impacts of consumers＇ low-carbon awareness, carbon trade price, retailer competition intensity, low-carbon promotion efficiency and its uncertainty on the supply chain members＇ optimal decisions profits. It shows that the retailers＇ promotion decisions are only affected by parameters of themselves. A retailer shares its cost information with the manufacturer only if its low-carbon promotion is efficiently enough. The manufacturer＇ s optimal emission reduction increases with the carbon trade price, consumers＇ low-carbon awareness, the retailers＇ low-carbon promotion efficiency and uncertainty, and decreases with the retailer competition intensity. The optimal profits of the supply chain members increase with the carbon trade price, consumers＇ low-carbon awareness, and decrease with intensity of retailer competition. As the low-carbon promotion efficiency uncertainty of the industry increases, the optimal profit of the manufacturer decreases while that of the retailer increases. When only one retailer is willing to disclose it cost information, the manufacturer can＇ t afford to pay another retailer to obtain its private cost information.

关 键 词：碳交易 碳减排 低碳意识 低碳推广 信息分享 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]