不同博弈框架下多竞争零售商的双渠道供应链定价决策研究  

Research on Pricing Decisions of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Multiple Competitive Retailers under Different Game Frameworks

作　　者：韦才敏[1,2] 李忠萍[1,2] 范衠 WEI Cai-min;LI Zhong-ping;FAN Zhun(Department of Mathematics, Shantou University, Shantou 515063, China;Guangdong Provincial Key Lab of Digital Signals and Image Processing, Shantou University, Shantou 515063, China)

机构地区：[1]汕头大学数学系,广东汕头515063 [2]汕头大学数字信号与图像处理技术重点实验室,广东汕头515063

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2018年第6期63-74,共12页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(16AGL010)

摘　　要：在Bertrand竞争、Stackelberg竞争及集中决策下,研究由单制造商与多竞争零售商组成的双渠道供应链的定价决策问题。运用两阶段优化技术、博弈论及矩阵论,讨论了多竞争零售商与单制造商在价格方面相互竞争的问题,给出不同市场竞争模式及集中决策下供应链成员的博弈均衡解。对比不同博弈框架及集中决策下供应链成员的定价决策,通过数值实验分析了价格敏感度及零售商个数对最优定价决策和最大利润影响,给出一些管理学理论与见解,为双渠道供应链中各成员的管理者制定最优决策提供理论支持。This paper studies the pricing decisions problem of dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple competitive retailers under Bertrand competition, Stackelberg competition and centralized decision-making. In this case, where manufacturer and multiple retailers compete with each other over price, we obtain the gaming equilibrium of the supply chain members using two-stage optimization technique, game theory and matrix theory under different competitive patterns and centralized decision-making case, respectively. We compare the pricing decisions of the supply chain members under different game frameworks and centralized deci- sion-making case, and by making a numerical experiment we analyze the influence of price sensitivity and the number of retailers on the optimal retailer price, and the maximum profits of channel members. In addition, we get some managerial implications and provide a theoretical support for dual-channel managers to develop the optimal decisions.

关 键 词：供应链管理 双渠道供应链 定价策略 博弈论 零售商 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]