基于动机的联合风险投资收益分配契约设计  

Design of The Profit Share Contract of Syndication in Venture Capital Based on Motivation

作　　者：蒲毅[1] 房四海[1] PU Yi;FANG Si-hai(School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2018年第6期140-147,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70673008)：现金流权视角的创业企业组合规模与组合结构研究

摘　　要：从联合风险投资的领导者采取联合投资的动机出发,考虑分配给跟随者的收益份额是否能达到目的,运用优化理论建立了联合投资双方的收益分配模型,提出了联合风险投资机构之间的收益分配契约设计的一种可供参考的方法,并用实例说明了模型方法的应用。研究还表明,潜在的市场竞争可能对领导者造成的损失越大,领导者越愿意给予跟随者更多的收益份额;当项目质量信息的不确定性越高,单独投资将存在较大风险的时候,为了获得项目质量信息的补充,也使得领导者愿意给予跟随者更多的收益份额。The leaders of the venture capital syndication need to consider whether it can achieve the purpose of introducing the followers. In order to solve this problem, based on the leader＇s motivation of syndication in venture capital, considering whether the rules for profits sharing can achieve the leader＇s goals, using optimization theory we establish a model of profits sharing between the leader and the follower, and then propose a new method of profits share contract designing in venture capital syndication. Furthermore, the application of the method is illustrated by two examples. The study indicates that the potential marketing competition is likely to cause a greater loss on the part of the leader, and the leader will be more willing to give the follower more profit share ; if the uncertainty degree of the project quality is much higher then investment alone there will be a greater risk, and it also makes the leader willing to give the follower more profit share in order to get the project quality information from the follower for complements.

关 键 词：风险投资 联合投资 动机 收益分配契约 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学] F270.5