意思表示真实的神话可以休矣  

The Myth of “the Truthfulness of Expressions of Intention” can Rest

作　　者：解亘[1] Xie Gen

机构地区：[1]南京大学法学院

出　　处：《苏州大学学报（法学版）》2018年第2期39-46,共8页Journal of Soochow University：Law Edition

摘　　要：《民法总则》沿袭《民法通则》的立场,将意思表示真实规定为法律行为有效的一般要件。但无论是司法实践还是民法学说,均从反面将意思表示不真实限缩解释为意思表示的瑕疵。这样的解释颠覆了有关意思表示之于法律行为效力的原则与例外,足以令人怀疑该规范的正当性和必要性。意思自治在本质上不过是一种制度性的自由,意思在其中固然扮演重要的角色,但并非唯一。较之于意思表示的真实与否,意思在多大程度上真实才是更符合实际的描述方式。意思表示真实之教义的荒谬之处,在于其无视其他原理的作用,仅将意思原理绝对化、神圣化。The “General Provisions of Civil Law” follows the standpoints of the “General Principles of Civil Law” and stipulates “the truthfulness of expressions of intention” as a general requirement for effective legal act. However,both the judicial practice and the civil law doctrine,in opposition interpretation,limit the untruthfulness of expressions of intention to the flaw of expressions of intention. Such an interpretation subverts the principle and exception concerning the role of expressions of intention in the validity of legal act,which makes the legitimacy and necessity of the norm doubtable. In essence,autonomy of the will or intention is nothing more than an institutional freedom. Although the will or intention does play an mportant role,it is not the only one. The extent to which the intention is true is a more realistic description than whether the meaning is true or not. The absurdity of the doctrine of “the truthfulness of expressions of intention” lies in its ignorance of the function of other principles,and its absolutization and sanctification of the principle of intention.

关 键 词：意思表示真实 教义 意思自治 制度性自由 

分 类 号：D923[政治法律—民商法学]