中小银行、银团贷款与小企业贷款  

Small and Medium-Sized Banks, Syndicated Loans and Lending to Small Enterprises

作　　者：马理[1] 高冰 葛斌[1] MA Li;GAO Bing;GE Bin

机构地区：[1]武汉大学金融系

出　　处：《金融论坛》2018年第6期24-37,共14页Finance Forum

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"中国经济新常态下的货币政策设计研究"(15AJL003);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"经济新常态下中国金融开放与金融安全研究"(17JZD015);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"经济发展新常态下我国货币政策体系建设研究"(15JZD013)

摘　　要：本文基于合作型博弈的视角,提出一种创新的小企业贷款难的理论解释与解决方案。研究发现,存在一个中小银行向小企业贷款的阈值条件,当中小银行的议价能力小于阈值条件时,由于向小企业贷款无利可图,中小银行将偏好组成银团向大企业提供贷款;只有当中小银行的议价能力大于阈值条件可以获得净收益时,中小银行才会向小企业提供贷款。通过修改模型中的某些参数变量并调整监管策略,可以适当地缓解小企业贷款难。The authors of this paper propose an innovative theoretical explanation and a solution for the difficulty in lending to small enterprises from the perspective of cooperative game theory. It＇s found that there is a threshold for small and medium-sized banks to lend to small enterprises, and if the bargaining power of small and medium-sized banks is below the threshold, the small and medium-sized banks prefer to form a syndicate to lend to large companies because it＇s unprofitable to lend to small enterprises; only the bargaining power of the banks is above the threshold and the banks can obtain net earnings, the banks will lend to small enterprises. By modifying some of the parametric variables in the model and adjusting regulatory strategies, the difficulty in lending to small enterprises can be alleviated.

关 键 词：中小银行 银团贷款 小企业贷款难 合作型博弈 

分 类 号：G21[文化科学—新闻学]