PPP项目中地位不对等主体努力水平及效用的博弈研究  

The Game Analysis of Optimal Effort and Utility Between PPP's Participants with Unequal Status

作　　者：范如国[1] 杨洲 Fan Ruguo;Yang Zhou.

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财政研究》2018年第5期25-34,共10页Public Finance Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目"基于异质性主体行为的产业集群低碳演化模型及其仿真研究"(71271159);国家社科重大基金项目"全面深化改革视阈下社会治理体制与机制创新研究"(14ZDA062);教育部人文社会科学研究专项课题"我国高等工程教育布局与产业发展协同对接的主要障碍;系统性机制及发展模式研究"(14JDGC012)

摘　　要：PPP项目中政府和私人部门的地位不对等会影响项目的效用。本文针对政府和私人部门在PPP项目建设和运营中付出努力水平的问题,将政府参与方细分为财政部门和项目主管部门,基于超额收益共享机制,综合考虑地位不对等因素,构建了一个两阶段stackelberg博弈模型,并通过数值模拟深入探讨了地位不对等及各参数水平下的最优努力水平和最优效用。结果表明,地位不对等及各效益产出因子均会影响努力水平和效用。本文认为,为提高PPP项目落地率及私人资本参与度,财政部门在制定税收及补贴政策时应充分考察私人部门的技术及资金实力;项目主管部门应关注双方的地位不对等程度,使项目的运作由政府主导逐步转化为政府引导,给予私人部门更多权利;此外,政府应选择合作意向高的私人投资者,以充分利用合作的溢出效应。In Public-Private Partnership（PPP） projects, the inequality between government and private sectors has greatly influenced projects＇ utility. In this paper, a two-stage stackelberg game model is constructed based on the inequality between the financial departments, project management sectors and the private sectors during the construction and operation period. According to numerical simulation, we conclude that inequality of status and efficiency factors will affect the effort level and utility. In order to promote the PPP project landing rate and the participation of private capital, the financial departments should consider the private sector＇s technical and capital strength when formulating taxation and subsidy policies. However, the project management departments should pay attention to the unequal status of both parties so as to transform its role of dominance into guidance to give private sectors more rights. At the same time, the government should choose a partner with high intention of cooperation to make full advantage of the spillover effect of cooperation.

关 键 词：PPP项目 超额收益共享 地位不对等 努力水平 

分 类 号：F282[经济管理—国民经济]