论最惠国条款适用于投资争端解决程序的平等理论困境  

On the Equality Dilemma of Applying the MFN Clause to the Investment Dispute Settlement Procedure

作　　者：田海[1] TIAN Hai(School of Law, Northwest U）ziversity, Xi＇an, Shanxi 710069, China)

机构地区：[1]西北大学法学院,陕西西安710069

出　　处：《时代法学》2018年第3期98-103,共6页Presentday Law Science

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"WTO争端解决中的中国现象与中国问题研究"(批准号:14AFX027)之阶段性成果

摘　　要：从立法论的视角来看,平等理论是最惠国条款得以适用的重要法理基础。当前国际仲裁中存在着将最惠国条款的适用范围从实体性领域扩大到程序性投资争端解决程序的实践。这种行为混淆了形式平等与实质平等,对平等理论造成了巨大的冲击,不但损害了最惠国条款得以适用的法理基础,也严重背离了缔约国的缔约目的。因此,在缔约国没有明确同意的情形下,不得将最惠国条款的适用范围扩大至投资争端解决程序。From the legislative perspective, the theocy of equality is the theoretical basis of most favored nation clause. In current international arbitration practice, the most favored nation clause is applicable to the investment dispute settlement procedure. That will damage the legal bases of the most favored nation clause, and bring serious deviation of the aim of the contracting parties. There- fore, unless the contracting parties will be clearly recognized, the application of MFN clause in international investment dispute settlement procedures is illegal and inappropriate.

关 键 词：平等 最惠国条款 国际仲裁 投资争端解决程序 

分 类 号：D996.4[政治法律—经济法学]