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作 者:徐涛[1] 尤建新[1,2] 邵一磊 Xu Tao;You Jianxin;Shao Yilei(School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China;School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)
机构地区:[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092
出 处:《科技管理研究》2018年第13期221-226,共6页Science and Technology Management Research
基 金:上海市软科学研究计划项目"高技术行业竞争力评价与培育"(16692180802))
摘 要:在高技术企业并购浪潮下,为有效提升并购效率,提高企业并购收益,引入进化博弈理论,对高技术企业的并购定价策略进行研究。研究发现,高技术企业的并购中,主并企业的吸收能力将有效提升其平均期望收益;并购双方向接受策略进化受并购双方谈判破裂发生概率、报价以及目标公司对自身的估值影响;通过进化博弈推导出主并企业报价策略,当主并企业不断学习了解目标公司信息并根据报价策略进行报价时,并购效率和收益将能有效提升。Chinese companies are experiencing a wave of diversified mergers and acquisitions. Among them, high- tech industries have become the fastest growing mergers and acquisitions industry. In order to effectively improve the effciency of mergers and acquisitions and improve the profitability ofM & A, this paper utilizes the evolutionary game theory and studies the M & A pricing strategy of high-tech enterprises. It is found that the absorptive capacity of M & A enterprises will effectively enhance the average expected return in the mergers and acquisitions. The evolution of the two sides to accept the strategy is affected by both probability of the rupture and the quotation and the impact of the target company on its own valuation. Through the evolution of the game to derive the main and corporate pricing strategy, the acquisition efficiency and benefits will be effectively improved when the mergers and acquisitions enterprises continue to learn and understand the target company information and offer according to the offer strategy.
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