财政分权、政府干预行为与地区不良贷款——基于省级面板数据实证分析  

Fiscal Decentralization,Government Intervention and Regional Non-performing Loans——An Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Data of China

作　　者：孙英杰 林春[1] SUN Yingjie;LIN Chun(School of Economics,Liaoning University,Shenyang,Liaoning 110036,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2018年第4期88-93,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：辽宁省社会科学规划重点基金(L17AJY008);辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学青年项目(WQN201725)

摘　　要：基于我国2006-2015年31个省(市、自治区)的面板数据,使用动态面板模型的GMM估计,检验财政分权、政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的影响。结果发现:财政分权与地区不良贷款规模呈正相关,即财政分权水平较高的地区会导致不良贷款的增加;分权下政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的作用也存在显著差异,中部地区的政府干预行为会抑制不良贷款的增加,而东、西部地区的政府干预行为则相反。Based on the panel data of 31 provinces（municipalities and autonomous regions）in China in 2006-2015 years,this paper applies the GMM technique to examine the impact of fiscal decentralization and government intervention on regional non-performing loans.The results are as follows：（1）The fiscal decentralization is positively correlated with the scale of non-performing loans in the region,which means that the higher level of fiscal decentralization will lead to the increase of non-performing loans;and（2）The government intervention under decentralization also has an important impact on regional non-performing loans.Among them,the excessive intervention in the East and the West regions plays a negative role,but the central part shows a positive effect.

关 键 词：财政分权 政府干预行为 不良贷款 系统矩估计 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]