基于环境库兹涅茨曲线的水环境规制研究  

Research on Water Environment Regulation Based on Environmental Kuznets Curve

作　　者：陈明[1] 邱俊钦 CHEN Ming;QIU Jun-qin(Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 332020,Chin)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学现代经济管理学院,江西南昌332020

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2018年第4期53-59,共7页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"中国城市民营化供水企业绩效影响因素与规制改革研究"(12BJY067)

摘　　要：随着中国城镇化进程加快,以政府投资为主导的水环境治理投资已无法满足日益增长的污水处理需求。通过研究2006-2015年间水环境规制相对效率,运用三方混合策略博弈分析政府、企业与社会公众的纳什均衡点,并实证检验了博弈分析的可靠性。结果表明,中国水环境污染状况存在反复性,呈现轻微的反"N型",基于水环境规制的利益集团博弈会影响水环境规制效果,因此要加大对企业污水排放的规制及强化对水环境监管部门违规行为的惩罚力度,完善社会监督机制等。With the acceleration of China’s urbanization process, the investment in water environment governance led by government investment has been unable to meet the growing demand for sewage treat ment. By studying the relative efficiency of water environment regulation during the period of 2006—2015,this paper makes use of the three-way mixed strategic game to analyze the Nash equilibrium point of governments, enterprises and the social public, then it conducts an empirical test on the reliability of the game analysis. The results show that the pollution situation of water environment in China is repetitive and presents a slight anti-N-type. The game between the interest groups based on water environment regulation will affect the effect of water environment regulation. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the regulation on corporate wastewater discharge, strengthen the punishment intensity on the violations by the water environment supervision departments, and improve social supervision mechanisms.

关 键 词：环境库兹涅茨曲线 水资源 环境规制 

分 类 号：F423.3[经济管理—产业经济]