基于博弈论的信息安全风险管理信念研究  

Research on Information Security Risk Management Belief Based on Game Theory

作　　者：潘平[1] 毛新月 周惠玲[2] 黄亮[1] PAN Ping;MAO Xin-yue;ZHOU Hui-ling;HUANG Liang(College of Computer Science and Technology,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China;School of Management,Guizhou University,Guiyang 550025,China;Wuhan Second State Tax Inspectorate,Wuhan 430021,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学计算机科学与技术学院,贵州贵阳550025 [2]贵州大学管理学院,贵州贵阳550025 [3]武汉市国家税务局第二稽查局,湖北武汉430021

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2018年第13期120-131,共12页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(13BZX020);国家自然科学基金地区项目(61662009);贵州省高等学校教学内容和课程体系改革(重点)项目(SJJG201404)

摘　　要：信息安全风险管理的核心是采取一系列安全策略，用以防御威胁对信息系统造成安全事件的措施．本质上是威胁与防御的博弈，这种博弈是动态的、非合作的、不完全信息的，可用扩展博弈模型加以描述．通过对博弈中信念及其主体间概率的理解，分析博弈风险管理信念，特别是作为主体集的风险管理信念对防御的影响，提出基于测量的安全风险管理信念的可容忍威胁以及对威胁的防御机制，为网络安全风险管理的定量研究提供了一种新的途径．The core of information security risk management is to adopt a series of security policies, which are used to prevent the threat of security incidents caused by the information system. In essence, it is a game of threat and defense, which is dynamic, non-cooperative, incomplete information, and can be described by the extended game model. With the understanding of the probability of belief and the main body in the game, this paper analyzes the game risk management belief, especially the risk management belief of the main body on the influence of defense, so as to provide a new approach to the quantitative research of the network security risk management based on the measurement of the security risk management beliefs and the defense mechanism.

关 键 词：安全管理 信念 可容忍 风险 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]